University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Faculty and Staff Publications

University Libraries

2008

Wade Hampton: Conflicted Leader of the Conservative
Democracy?
Fritz Hamer
University of South Carolina - Columbia, fphamer@mailbox.sc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/lib_facpub
Part of the History Commons

Publication Info
Published in Wade Hampton III - A Symposium, ed. Nicolas G. Meriwether, 2008, pages 89-106.
http://library.sc.edu/develop/uscsinfo.html
© 2008 by The University South Caroliniana Society

This Book Chapter is brought to you by the University Libraries at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty and Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more
information, please contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

r
WADE HAMPTON: CONFLICTED LEADER
OF THE CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRACY?
Fritz P. Hamer

In April 1877, Wade Hampton Ill, Confederate military
hero and now political "savior," declared to a Columbia crowd
on his return from Washington that they should "forget we are
Democrats or Republicans, white or colored, and remember only
that we are all South Carolinians."1 Although Hampton may have
used some political hyperbole to soothe a fractious electorate, the
now undisputed governor of the Palmetto State wanted to convince
the white Democracy that blacks, most of them fonner slaves,
should be allowed to participate in the political process. Of course,
the litmus test for this to happen had to be that African Americans
repudiate the Republican Party. This party. which in the minds of
most South Carolina whites had corrupted and nearly ruined the
state since 1866. had championed the rights of the former slaves.
While white Democrats appeared united in their hatred of the
Radical Republican regimes of Reconstruction, their rule had ended
in 1877. Now Hampton offered an olive branch, of sorts, to those
whom he had reviled for over a decade.
Most of Hampton's Democratic allies supported the former
general's overtures since they expected that African Americans
would have few alternatives. But some allies of Hampton in 1876
disagreed. Fonner Confederate officers Matthew C. Butler and
Martin Gary. for example, had no patience for reconciliation with
blacks. The battle for the state government-for the very integrity
of a white South Carolina in their minds- was to eliminate all
opponents. white and black. Foremost among these were the
I Quoted in Walter Brian Cisco, Wade Hampton. Confederate Warrior, Conser\'ative Statesman (Washington. DC: 8rassey's, 2004), 266. The autho r wishes to
thank Jennifer Fitzgerald, a colleague al the South Carolina State Museum, for
reading this paper and providing valuable comments and suggestions.
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reviled Republicans, but more generally, they sought to squelch the
political participation of all non-whites. Did Hampton believe his
prestige and personal qualities to be strong enough that he could
overcome such powerful hatreds, or was his Columbia rhetoric just
that, something to offer the opposition until he and his lieutenants
could eliminate them completely from the political arena? This
paper will review Hampton 's motives and relationships up to the
election of 1876 and argue that perhaps there was a little of both.
But in the fina l analysis, Hampton represented white resurgence and
retrenchment, and whi le he may have believed that fonner slaves
could be a part of the political process, it was only on the terms of
Hampton and his white lieutenants. In their minds only whites had
the ability, indeed the very right, to govern the state. But to find out
what led Hampton to his Redeemer leadership role in the crucial
election of 1876, one must fir st review his background. 2
Until secession, Hampton had done little to suggest that he
would be embroi led in contentious politics. Although his grandfather
had held prestigious military posts, first in the Revolution and later
in the War of 1812, and his father had also attained distinction in the
latter war, the family's focus was to attain land, slaves and wealth.
When Wade fIT was born in 1818, he became part of one of the most
privi leged fami lies in the American South. The Hampton fami ly
already controlled vast acreage in the South Carolina midlands,
owned hundreds of slaves, and made millions growing cotton. They
had few social or economic peers. Wade Hampton rn was not just a
wealthy son of a prominent fami ly, but well educated and traveled,
having attained a degree from South Carolina College and toured
extensively in Europe and the Northeast during his young adult life.
Nonetheless, his most important station in life was to become a
successfu l plantation manager who would direct a vast estate of
cotton lands from which great wealth would continue to be derived.
In 1843 he began to manage the family plantation in Mississippi that
included twelve thousand acres and nearly one thousand enslaved
2 Ibid., 275-276.
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workers. Between these holdings and those in the midlands of
South Carolina, Hampton traveled regularly to manage both. His
favorite activities, hunting and fishing, could also be acquitted in
such endeavors. Like his father and grandfather, Wade III viewed
politics as a secondary role in society that he re luctant ly assumed.
Richland District constituents elected him to the South Carolina
House of Representatives for the first time in 1852, and six years
later, the same voters elevated him to the state senate. In neither
chamber did he distinguish himself, rarely speaking while serving
on legislative committees on federal relations, agriculture, and
redistricting. Not unti l his last years in the antebellum legislature
did he even speak out on major issues. In short it seems that he
served in the State House because his social position requ ired it. 3
Such modest political ambitions began to change, as the
rift between North and South grew more intense at the end of the
1850s. Hampton spoke out against John Brown's raid on Harpers
Feny in the fall of 1859, warning that if the North did not condemn
the radical abolitionist the Union could not survive. Although he
did not lead the charge, when Lincoln became the Republican
presidential nominee, the South Carolina planter supported plans
for a secession convention if the Illinois lawyer were elected. He
not only voiced his support for such a body but also joined the
Minutemen, groups of men in communities around the state that
supported secession prior to the elections. Throughout the fa ll
campaign season, these groups held pub lic demonstrations in their
own regalia and wrote a manifesto supporting secession. In the
wake of Lincoln's election victory, Hampton continued to support
the call ing of a convention although he was not elected to that body.
When the state seceded, Hampton immediately offered his services
to defend the newly independent "nation. " But in the midst of the
J Ibid., 10-12, 17, 23, 29, 3 1. 46; Wade Hampton III to E. Ham, I January 1877,

in Hampton Family Pape':'S. South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina. hereafter noted as HFP; N. Louise Bailey. Mary L. Morgan. and Caro lyn
R. Taylor, Biographical Direcloryofth e South Carolina Senate, 1776-1985, vol.
I (Columbia: University o f South Carolina Press, 1986),656-9 .
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crisis, as South Carolina faced off against the federal goverrunent
over the status of Fort Sumter at the mouth of Charleston barbor,
Hampton left th~ state in March 1861 to check hi s holdings in
Mississippi. It was upon his return to the Palmetto State two weeks
after Fort Sumter surrendered that Hampton began to organize
his now famous legion. Not only its founder, the planter-turnedsoldier became the legion's financier, using his vast wealth to pay
for its soldiers ' uniforms, equipment, and firearms. By late spring
the Confederate high command ordered Hampton 's Legion north to
defend the newly anointed capital of Richmond, Virginia,4
Hampton 's many exploits as a military leader, first of his
legendary Hampton's Legion and then as cavalry commander,
are we ll known. After the Confederate armies reorganized in the
spring of 1862, the legion was split up and its commander became
a subordinate under the renowned cavalry general, J. E. B. Stuart.
Upon this legendary figure 's death in May 1864, Hampton's
di stinguished service and abilities led to his promotion as Stuart's
successor as commander of all Confederate cavalry in the Anny
of Northern Virginia. Owing his long and distinguished service,
the South Carolinian received many wounds in daring attacks
against Federal cavalry and infantry from Manassas to Gettysburg
to Petersburg. In the last months of the war Hampton went home
in a doomed attempt to stop William T. Shennan's march through
the Carolinas. Loyal and determined to war 's end, Hampton 's
resilience seems more tragic because of hi s own personal losses.
First, his brother Frank fell mortally wounded at Brandy Station
in June 1863. Then, more than a year later, his son Preston was
killed in an engagement near Petersburg. To compound these tragic
deaths, at the war's end Hampton's family home at Millwood,just
outside Columbia, was burned to the ground by Shennan's troops.
Hi s holdings in Mississippi , including three steam cotton gins and
4,700 bales of cotton, were also lost. Perhaps Hampton 's greatest
capital loss, however, was the more than one thousand enslaved
4

Cisco,

Wad~

Hampton, 5 1-52.

-
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workers who now were free . The state's most distinguished
Confederate military commander, in spite of all his dedication to the
Southern cause, found himself virtually destitute financia ll y, if not
emotionally.S Despite his best efforts, Hampton cou ld only recover
a small portion of his holdings following his declared bankruptcy

in 1868.
In the midst of such personal and capital losses Hampton
was slow to accept the new social and political order dawning on
post~war South Carolina. Although he rejected emigration to South
America Of Europe as some of his fonner ~onfederate comrades
had done, he was slow to reconcile himself to the Confederacy's
demise. In the summer of 1866, he told his fonner cornmanderin-chief, Robert E. Lee, that "J am not reconstructed yet . .. " and
declared to him, ''Time will prove that you have not fought in
vain."6 Clearly. Hampton would not easi ly concede that four years
of bloodshed and personal loss had been a national and personal
waste.
As the defeated fonnerConfederate tried to cope with his own
personal loss, the political and economic changes occurring within
hi s state became more alarming. For a brief period it appeared that
former Confederates wou ld be able to resume the reigns of power
with the blessings of President Andrew Johnson. But a Republican
Congress soon refused to accept Johnson's lenient terms for the
fonner Confederacy and reversed Presidential Reconstruction with
a series of laws in 186~ . Instead, they imposed severe restrictions
on most of the old leadership and required the Southern states to
accept former slaves as equals in politica l and social arenas fo r the
fi rst time. This was an affront, if not worse, to most whites and they
soon showed their opposition.
Hampton expressed this bitterness to President Andrew
Johnson in detail. He denounced what he perceived as a vindictive
~ Ibid., 55· 163; Charles E: Cauthen, ed., Family Lellersofthe Three Wade Hamp·
tons, 1782- 1901 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1953), 113·4;
Wade Hampton III [0 E. Ham, 1 January 1877 , HFP.
6 Wade Hampton 11110 R.E. Lee, typescript, 21 July 1866, HFP.
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Congress that was led by Radical Republicans who usurped their
authority and ignored the Constitution by forcing the Southern
states to adopt the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments without
due deliberation of their respective leaders. To Hampton, the
amendments w.ere forced upon the South ill egally. Somehow he
could not accept that Congress responded to thwart the South
Carolina legislature who had passed a series of "Black Codes" the
previous year tbat severely restricted the movement of freedmen
and essentially returned them to the life of servitude that they had
recent ly left. Nor could Hampton see the purpose of what he viewed
as a corrupt Freedmen's Bureau and "a horde of barbarians- your
brutal negro troops" that imposed law and order in the South.
Such organizations were an affront to whites, especially to former
slaveholders who were accustomed to virtual life and death mastery
over blacks. Such a response was narural for men like Hampton
who had been raised to believe that only they had the ability and
the right to govern the affairs of their state. That former slaves
were now free men to whom Congress had given political rights
was unfathomable to Hampton. Such a monolithic shift in social
strucrure was incomprehensible, even if his beloved South was
defeated. 7
His bitterness slowly waned in the fo llowing months but
Hampton remained "true to his upbringing as a planter and fanner
slaveholder. Even though he advocated limited political rights for
freedmen he advised his white friends that they could still control the
state legislature by controlling the black vote. As in the antebellum
era, Hampton and most of his class could not conceive that former
slaves had the ability to behave rationally in the political arena.
Former slaveholders believed that freedmen were still imbued with
the traits rel~gating them to subservience, just as they had been in
slavery. African Americans needed people like Hampton to instruct
and prevent them from hanning themselves. Such a conclus ion came
from the paternalistic, racist view that blacks were unable to think
1 Caulhen, Family Letters, 126-141 .
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for themselves or recognize their own best interests. By 1867 he told
lohn Conner, a fellow South Carolinian and Confederate veteran,
that it was the duty of " every Southern man" to secure the "good will
and confidence of the negro." It was even acceptable to send blacks
to Congress since Hampton considered them more trustwonhy than
"renegades or Yankees," provided that "respectable negroes" were
recruited. Presumably this meant freedmen whom whites knew
could be relied upon, whether by bribery or intimidati on, to accept
and serve Southern whites in a loyal- i.e., subordinate--manner.8
The assumptions of Hampton and his associates were sorely
tested during the following decade as the battle with Republican
rule in the state ebbed and flowed. First, most white voters tried
to forestall the election of delegates to a new state Constitutional
Convention mandated by Congress. Since a majority of the state's
registered electorate had to ratify the call of such a convention,
a large number of white voters registered their protest by not
casting their ballots on election day in November 1867. Despite
this unity, the vast majority of registered black voters--eighty-five
percent- who voted for such a body were enough to validate the
elections fo r the Constitutional Convention that met two months
later. Not surprisingly its majority of black delegates drafted a new
constitution that ushered in tax and land refonn, the first fonnal
public education system and more.
Nonetheless the former cavalry leader continued to believe
that whites could influence enough freedmen so that Democratic
conservatives could control the .legislature when the next round
of fall election s occurred. But Hampton's assumptions proved
false. The Radical Republicans won a significant majority and
began to implement their reform agenda- including raising taxes.
implementing land redistribution, and installing a grassroots publi c
B Wade Hampton tIl to John Connor, typescri pt, 24 March 1868, HFP. For the
general attitude towards blacks by most whites in the state after 1865, one of the
best overviews is ·Stephen Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman and (he Reconstruction oj
White Supremacy (Chapel Hill : University of North Caroli na Press, 2000), 41 ,
44.
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education system. These bold moves threatened white conservatives
who feared losing control of black labor and the political process,
the latter to a Republican Party with majority black support. Most
white leaders believed that they had to prevent this and take back
the reigns of power to forestall political and social chaos. Although
some whites, even Hampton for a time, advocated some form of
peaceful accommodation with the Republicans, most believed that
only intimidation and violence could prevail and resurrect white
control. Martin Gary and Matthew C. Butler characterized the dire
nature of this new struggle as an attempt by Republicans to place
the "negro over the white man" a maneuver that demonstrated
Republi cans were "at war with the noblest instincts of our [white]
race." Conservative radical s such as Butler believed that whites who
tried to reach political accommodation with fonner slaves were badly
mi sled, ifnot traitors to their race. Butler and his supporters, known
as "straight outs," began a campaign of intimidation and violence
to attain victory for conservative Democrat s. Such violence ranged
from beatings to murder, with one of the more extreme cases being
the assassination of a black leader, Benjamin Randolph . In Octoher
1868, while campaigning in Abbeville for a seat in the legislature,
several shots rang out in the local train station, killing Randolph
instantly. Yet even in this violent atmosphere blacks and thei r white
allies went to the polls in November to elect a Radical ticket.9
Hampton could not legall y run for polit ical office because
Congress barred high-ranking Confederate offi cers from public
service, yet his work behind the scenes was not impeded by the
Republi can victory of November 1868. Since his prediction that
whites could control the black vote had failed he seemed to discard
hi s hopes.in that arena. In stead, Hampton tacitly supported the Klan
9 For the failed effort to forestall the election of delegates to the state constitution in November 1867, see Walter Edgar, South Carolina : A History (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, \998), 385-86. For the division among
whites in 1868 and the violent plan led by people like Gary, sec Richard Zucuk,
Stat~ of R~b~lIion : R~COl1Struction in South Carolina (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 1996), 51 .
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violence that accelerated in the wake of the 1868 elections. Primarily
in the Upstate, bands of vigilantes, often clad in frightening regalia,
intimidated and attacked Republican supporters, white and black,
with impunity. Unable to end the violence, Republican Governor
Robert K. Scott appealed to the president and Congress for Federal
troops to help stem the carnage. After the president invoked the
Third Enforcement Act, commonly known as the Ku Klux Klan
Act, in April 1871, Federal troops soon arrested several hundred
suspected Klansmen. Even though Hampton publicly spoke out
against the violence, he nonetheless led a su~scription effort on
behalf of the accused for their legal defense. Although at least one
historian has called the federal law timid and asserted that it should
have been imposed earlier and more forcefully, the action ended
most of the violence. Hundreds were incarcerated and trials were
held. Unfortunately for the federal authorities, so many suspects
turned themselves in, along with those captured, that the courts and
jails could not process the huge backlog that was created in the legal
system. This, coupled with the expert defenses that the accused
received through the moral support and financial backing of people
such as Hampton and Matthew C. Butler, meant that only a token
number of accused Klansmen received convictions. Even those that
did generally received light prison sentences. Although this spate
of violence came to an end , the lull proved to be temporary. As the
elections of the fall of 1876 began in earnest, white conservative
elements re-ignited their campaign of intimidation and violence.
And this lime Hampton led the effort by running for governor. I 0
Although former Confederates at all levels were given
amnesty by Congress in 1872, Hampton had remained too
preoccupied with family issues and his poor finances to take a
leadership role in the fight against the Radical Republicans. His
10 For the support Hampton gave the Klansmen indicted, see Zuczek, State o/Rebellion, 100. For the violence perpetrated by the organization, see Zuczek, State
0/ Rebellion, 94-100; and Cisco, Wade Hampton, 204-206. Also see Lou Falkner
Williams, The Great South Carolina Ku Klux Klan Trials, 1871- 1872 (Athens:
University of Georgia Press, 1996),5 3.
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efforts to improve his financial condition collapsed when the
insurance company he joined went into bankruptcy less than a year
after his appointment to its board. Still, he maintained a keen interest
in the political future of his home state. Thus, when ex-Confederate
leaders approached him in June 1876 to be the Democratic Party 's
nominee for governor, he accepted,ll
Hampton's social position and heroic role as a Confederate
leader made him tbe best standard bearer for the conservative
Democrats. Unanimously nominated in an August convention, the
soldier-turned-politician began a campaign across the state, from
the Upcountry to tpe Lowcountry, defending the virtues of his party
and castigating the conupt and spendthrift ways of the Radical
Republicans. But Hampton's speeches and his obvious public
appeal as a hero of the defeated Confederacy were possible largely
because of the political army-mounted Red Shirts- that bolstered
his appeal and protected him in every community to which he took
his campaign.
In Anderson, Sumter, Winnsboro and Yorkville during
the fall campaign Hampton was met by an impressive entourage
of local dignitaries, admiring young ladies and scores, sometimes
hundreds, of mounted Red Shirts. For one campaign rally in
Winnsboro on October 16, 1876, an elaborate itinerary was created
and fliers posted throughout the community. It outlined where the
local Democratic dignitaries were to stand, the place of "colored
clubs" and how the "mounted men" should arrange themselves so
that "colored people of both parties" cou ld be admitted in front of
them. In Yorkville a grand parade met Hampton at the train station
liOn Congressional amnesty for former Confederates, see Eric Foner, Recon·
struction: Americas Unfinished Revolution, /863-1877 (New York: Harper and
Row, 1988),504. For Hampton's tragic personal and financial problems in this
period, SCI! Cisco, Wade Hampton, 198-201 ,2 10-11. And for Hampton's rel uctant
acceptance of the Democratic nomination for govcrnor, sec typescript narration,
July 25, 1876, HFP; and Walter Allen, Governor Chamberlain s Administration
in South Carolina: A Chapter of Reconstruction in the Southern States (New
York: a.p. Putnam's Sons, 1888), 400. For Hampton's reluctance to run in the
1876 gubernatorial race, see Cisco, 217, 223
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and rumed out for the Democratic nominee 's stump speech where
he appealed not only to whites but also to blacks. After castigating
the corrupt Republicans in Columbia and their governor, Daniel
Chamberlain, for the umpteenth time, he appealed for black support.
Ironically Hampton claimed that blacks had become "slaves to your
political masters" and that to be "freemen they must leave the Loyal
League" and join with him to bring "free speech, free ballot, a free
press." And yet just a decade before most blacks had been slaves
for life to Hampton and his class, devoid of any rights whatsoever.
Fear prevented many minority voters from asserting the courage to
openly disagree with Red Shirts ready to pounce on any dissenters
in the crowd. Except in the LowcounLry, where blacks outnumbered
whites, few of these grand political rallies allowed the opposition to
rebut Hampton's c1aims.12
In spite of Hampton 's appeals on the stump and his
professed opposition to campaign violence, his Red Shirt supporters
ruthlessly used intimidation and violence throughout the Upstate to
suppress Republican opposition. One Laurens County Republican
group appealed to Governor Chamberlain for protection because no
one "dares to speak nor act with respect of his franchise privileges
without being in extreme danger. " Individual acts of violence
sometimes expanded into major battles that led to injury and death
on a large scale. Just as the campaign began in earnest, the Ellenton
riots of September 1876 saw black militia carry on a running battle
with Red Shirt companies for almost two days before Federa l
troops intervened to end the carnage. At least fifty blacks and one
white Red Shirt lay dead at its conclusion. Similarly at Cainhoy,
iri the Lowcountry. blacks and whites faced off again. Here the
black militia got the better of the action but still whites inflicted
nearly as many casualties on the Republicans before they fled . With
such brutal violence .going on all around him, Hampton seemed to
12 For details about the Hampton political rallies, see "Celebration in Honor of
General Wade Hampton at Winnsboro," 16 October 1876. HFP; and Yorkville
Enquirer. October 19. 1876. The author wishes to thanIc. Debra Franklin, Mu·
sewn researcber, for taking extensive notes of the latter for tbis srudy.
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remain above the fray, arguing before black audiences why they
should support his election. Through an alliance with the whites,
"who owned the land ... pay the taxes," blacks cou ld help redeem
the state. But, he warned, if they continued with their "carpet-bag
friends (the Repub licans]" they would lose aid or support when
needed, presumably from whites. I)
Some former slaves seemed to take Hampton's words to
heart because, as Edmund Drago shows in his recent study, the
white Red Shirt clubs had black allies. According to this historian,
there were at least eighteen black Democratic Clubs organized
during the 1876 political campaign. How many of these clubs
actually were formed by political coercion from whites or from
genuine disillusionment by blacks with the Republican leadership
is difficult to determine. Evidence gathered by Drago suggests that
these black organizations had members that joined for a variety
of reasons, some from conviction, others out of necessity. Some
African Americans felt that even if the Democrats were not their
best political allies they did not think. that the Republican Party
could protect them. Consequently in order to continue living and
working in their communities some fonner slaves believed they
needed to gain favors from white Democrats that would protect and
sustain them during and after the elections. 14
Although bhick Red Shirts did exist, it is clear that most
African Americans remained loyal to the Republican Party despite
the growing divisions within its ranks during the campaign. And
for those minority voters that switched their allegiance, most faced
severe rebuke from fellow blacks, including their wives. Within
most black communities such betrayal often led to expu lsion from
the household and someti mes even physical assaults. Nonetheless,
13 Zuczek, State of Rebellion, 176-78; Dewitt Grant Jones, "Wade Hampton and
Ihe Rhetoric of Race: A Study of the Speaking of Wade Hampton on the Race
Issue in South Carolina, 1865-1878,'- (PhD diss., Louisiana State University,
1988), 144-45.
14 Edmund L. Drago, Hurrahfor Hampton : Black Red Shirts in South Carolina
During Reconstruction (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1998), 16,

22-34.
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white intimidation by the Red Shirts and their alli es was far greater.
Even so, the results at the polls were very close when the November
ballots were tall ied. Although the conservative Democrats had a lead
of just over one thousand votes across the state, this was initially
nullified by the vote count in Laurens and Edgefield Counties. In
these two districts, county commissioners reported voter fraud
where Democrats received more votes than actual voters available.
This began the long stalemate over who had won the election. For
the next several months RepUblicans and Democrats both claimed
victory.IS
Hampton declared himself the winner and demanded that
his Republican opponent step down . Backed by Federal troops,
Chamberlain refused, almost leading to a bloody riot during the
last days of November 1876 as both Republican and Democratic
legislators declared victo ry for themselves and proceeded to occupy
the same chamber in the South Carolina State House. Led by dual
speakers, E. W. M. Mackey for the Republicans and Willi am H.
Wallace for the Democrats. a tense atmosphere continued for four
days with both sides refusing to leave the chambers.
Surrounded by Federal troops, on the morning of the fourth
day the Democrats reluctantly voted to leave voluntarily when the
troops outside seemed poised to remove them by force. However, as
this occurred. disgruntled whites had begun to arrive in Columbia
from many areas of the state to gather around the still unfinished
State House, seemingly bent on throwing out the Republican
members regardless of the Federal troops. Before violence could
break out, Hampton showed his true leadership. Appearing before
IS For a review of the vote tallies and the stalemate that ensued see Zuczek. State
of Rebellion, 193. For black attempts to switch to the Democratic side and how
insignificant this actually was see Jocl Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in
South Carolina During Recorutruction. /86 1-/877 (Chapel Hill : University of
North Carolina Press, 1965),408-41 2. Nevertheless. Cisco tries to claim that
many blacks did switch to the Dcmocrats: see Cisco, Wad~ Hampton, 232-34.
Also see Richard M. Gergel, "Wadc Hampton and the Rise of O ne Party Racial
Orthodoxy in South Carolina," The Proceedings a/the South Carolina Historical
Association ( 1977). 6-9.
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the mob, he requested that they di sperse. A s they did S0, the authority

of Hampton was obvious and the legitimacy of the Republican
governor and his party was irrevocably compromised. 16
Yet while Chamberlain tried to hang on with the aid of

Federal troops and Congressional backing, Hampton had enough
publi c support to have himself inaugurated governor even though
he lacked the legal authority. in December 1876 Hampton declared
in his acceptance speech that he owed much of hi s success to black
voters who "rose above prejudice o f race and [were] honest enough to
throw ofTthe shackles of party." Yet even though Hampton publicly
claimed this support, others in hi s own party reali zed that it was the

bands of Red Shirts, with their intimidation tactics and recourse to
violence, who had really "won" the election for him. On election
day in one Lexington precinct, a Democratic observer admitted that
only ten blacks voted the conservative ticket. Although it is difficult
to say how many blacks actually voted Democratic across the state,
one hi storian estimates that probably no more than one hundred
blacks in each county voted for Hampton and his party.17
Nonetheless, even without substantial black support,
Hampton eventually forced his Republican rival to resign his
office. As he and Chamberlain di sputed each other's legitimacy
into the spring of 1877, the hopes of RepUblicans that somehow
the Radical ticket could sti 11 win grew ever dimmer. Hampton and
his Red Shirts advised supporters to pay taxes to the Democracy,
not Columbia, so that the Republican regime could not operate the
daily duties of government. In fact, the power of the conservative
Democracy had grown so that just before Chamberlain resigned his
office in April 1877, Hampton reputedly claimed that if the fonner
governor had not given up his office he would have had every tax
16 For an account of the stalemate in the State House after the election see Cisco,
Wade Hampton, 250-2.
17 For an account of Hampton's inaugural address and its content see Charleston
News and Courier, December 14, 1876, extra edition, HFP; and Cisco, Wade
Hampton, 256-8. For estimates on the number of black voters that supported
Hampton see Williamson, After Slavery, 411.
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collector in the state hanged. But the final chapter in Republican
rule only ended after Hampton visited the president in Washington.
There, after he assured the newly inaugurated Rutherford B. Hayes
that he would guarantee political rights and protection to blacks as
well as whites, regardless of party, the president agreed to pull out
all remaining Federal troops from the state. With federal protection
now gone, Chamberlain had no other recourse but to resign his
office and leave the state. IS
With Hampton and the Democrats finally undisputed
victors, the fonner cavalry hero continued to claim that he regarded
both races as equals before the law and that African Americans
should enjoy the same political rights and protections as whites.
Perhaps the Redeemer governor truly believed this but some, if not
most, of his lieutenants did not. Just as they had directed the Red
Shirt campaign, Matthew C. Butler and Martin Gary demanded that
every white voter make sure that he intimidated every black voter
he knew to either vote Democratic, or not at all, through whatever
means he had. They were detennined to use any means at thei r
disposal 10 elect Hampton and throw out the Republicans. 19
Whether Hampton considered that racial dominance was the
essence of the struggle or not, it is obvious that he viewed blacks as
second-class citizens who could only participate in politics under
white supervision. Old Confederates such as M. C. Butler were
detennined to eradicate black political participation, regardless
of who might supervise black voters. Although Butler's extreme
position- advocating the removal of African Americans from the
State House and all local offices as well- failed in the early post·
Reconstruction era, over time black political participation was
steadily eroded. It started within months of Hampton assuming
undisputed office in the spring of 1877. In Richland County,
Senator Beverly Nash and State Supreme Court Justice Jonathan
18 On the claim by Hampton, see Cisco, Wade Hampton, 267. For the end of
Chamberlain's tenure, see Cisco, Wade Hampton, 266·9.
19 For more, see especially William J. Cooper, Th e Conservative Regime: South
Carolina, /877- /890 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968).
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Wright were forced to resign their offices by the fall of 1877 after
trumped-up charges of corruption and drunkenness were brought
against them. By the early I 880s most blaek politicians resigned
even if they weren't directly threatened, once they realized how
tenuous their own position in the white-dominated government
had become. But a few Afiican Americans held onto their offices
through the 1880s because they came from predominately black
counties. Yet even the few who clung to political office had little
but symbolic impact on policy. By the 1890s, white supremacy
wou ld be complete and remained so for nearly a century.20
As for Hampton, his political leadership continued to have
impact through the 1878 election. He worked to improve funding
for the budding public education system created by the Republicans
and expend itures per pupil continued to ri se for both blacks and
whites through the decade of the 1880s under those who succeeded
Hampton. But while Hampton 's legacy for equal education
appeared genuine, that for equality in the po litical process never
did . Constitutional offices during the Hampton years became all
white.
In addition to legal ways of excluding African-American
voters from exercising their rights at the ballot box, the former
general's party lieutenants also found ways to stuffballots and restrict
minority voters through literacy tests and grandfather clauses. And
not only did Hampton oversee new voting rights restrictions, he
did little to support the few remaining African Americans in local
20 On Wright 's removal from office. sec Richard Gergel and Belinda Gergel,
'''To Vindicate the Cause of the Downtrodden ': Associate Justice Jonathon Jas·
per Wright and Reconstruction in South Carolina," in At Freedom 's Door, Afri.
can American Founding Falhers and Lawyers in Reconstruction South Carolina,
ed. James Lowell Underwood and W. Lewis Burke, Jr. (Columbia: University of
South Carolina Press, 2000), 64-7. On Beverly Nash's remova l, see John Hammond Moore, Columbia and Richland County: A S()uth Carolina Community,
1740-J990 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), 265·6. For the
general campaign used by Hamplon and his allies to remove most blacks from
office, see Moore, Columbia and Richland County, 267. For a comprehensive
examination of the removal of blacks from politics in the I880s, see Cooper, The
Conservative Regime, 90-107.
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offices, even if they were Democrats. The few that gained local
offices did not keep them long after Hampton left to become United
States Senator in 1879.21
In 1878 Hampton was elected to a second term as governor
but plans were already afoot to send him to Washington where his
influence on state politics would be minimized. Although the war
hero's prestige as a Redeemer leader would survive as a symbol of
white supremacy over the hated Radical regime, his presence on the
political stage was no longer essential to white political dominance.
Now over sixty, Hampton 's age was probably affecting his ability.
And there were younger leaders, some former Confederates, who
were ready to take over the reigns ofreal political control. In late
1878, fo llowing a serious hunting accident, Hampton's very survival
seemed precarious. The conservative regime that Hampton had
returned to power in 1877 continued to maintain political control
through most of the 1880s, but their days were numbered as Ben
Tillman's star began to rise.
Even though the hero and leader ofthe 1876 election survived
his accident and continued his political career in Washington for
another decade, Hampton became largely a symbol of the old
guard whose i~uence on state politics was steadily eroded. While
respected by most of his colleagues in the U. S. Congress, Hampton's
tenure had little significance for the state or the narion. He rarely
spoke to the assembled body and often missed sessions because
of illness or infinnity. By the end of the 1880s, even his symbolic
va1ue to the state's young Turks, led by Tillman, was finished. At
the end of the decade the state senate voted him out ofoffice. 22
Hampton lived for another decade struggling to support his
family while attending Confederate reunions inside and outside the
21 On Hampton's short tenure as governor and his modest success in carrying out
his election promises to blacks, see Kantrowitz, Ben 7Ulman, 78·79; Williamson,
After Slavery, 412-17; .and Cooper, The Conservative Regime, 90, 96, 11 1- 12.
Also see Gergel, "Wade Hampton," 9-14.
22 On Hampton's health and waning influence see Cisco, Wade Hampton, 270324; and Kantrowitz, Ben TIllman , 91 -4, 185.
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state when his health pennitted. When he died in April 1902, he
was praised for his determination and bravery as a soldier who did
all in his power to protect his state during four years of war. There
is no denying that he was one of the last of the old cavaliers who
fought ferociously for his state, but his political leadership during
and after Reconstruction is not so clear. While Hampton continued
to fight for his state, he did so from the perspective of an old guard
trying to return the state to some semblance of its pre-war days .
Steeped in the old white planter view of society where blacks
and most whites accepted the planter oligarchy without question,
Hampton envisioned an ordered world, as he perceived it had been
before secession. Although he opposed violence after Appomattox,
he sti ll acquiesced in the Red Shirt campaign of 1876.
Even though he continued to claim that he had garnered a
significant number of black votes to win back the state in 1876, most
white supporters from that election later admitted that Hampton
was misled. According to Ben Tillman, reflecting on these events
years later, despite Hampton's claim that he had won sixteen
thousand votes from black constiruents in 1876, « . . . every active
worker in the cause knew that in this he was woefully mistaken." A
noble soldier, Wade Hampton was at best a resolute but reactionary
politician. While he was willing to accept blacks in the political
arena, it could only be on white tenns.
Despite his rhetoric to the contrary, Hampton accepted
white methods of intimidation and violence to save the state from
what he and other white leaders considered chaos under a black
dominated Republican Party. He, like most whites, believed that
the best option for all , black and white, was a paternalistic society
that controlled the economic and political course of the state. To
Hampton, equitable distribution of political power and economic
freedom for recently freed slaves was a recipe for disaster. His
philosophy and upbringing made his political career one of reaction
and retrenchment. 23
23 Kantrowitz, Ben Tillman, 78·79. Kantrowitz argues persuasively that Hampton's patemalistic view of race was really little different from the violence which
Ben Tillman and M. C. Butler advocated in 1876. [n the end both sides believed
that the only conceivable order of society was for whites 10 dominate blacks.

